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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new model of selection behavior under
risk that describes an essential cognitive process for comparing values
of objects and making a selection decision. This model is constructed
by the quantum-like approach that employs the state representation
specific to quantum theory, which has the mathematical framework
beyond the classical probability theory. We show that our quantum
approach can clearly explain the famous examples of anomalies for
the expected utility theory, the Ellsberg paradox, the Machina para-
dox and the disparity between WTA and WTP. Further, we point
out that our model mathematically specifies the characteristics of the
probability weighting function and the value function, which are basic
concepts in the prospect theory.
1
1 Introduction
Many studies on selection behavior have been done mainly in economics and
psychology. In economics, the expected utility theory ([Neumann & Morgenstern(1953)])
is traditionally used to discuss selection behaviors under risk, which are re-
garded as normative and rational from the view of the probability theory.
In psychology, anomalies for the expected utility theory have been verified
through a large number of experimental tests.
Among the two disciplines, behavioral economics based on the prospect
theory ([Kahneman & Tversky(1979), Tversky & Kahneman(1992)]) has been
developed. The prospect theory is categorized into subjective expected util-
ity (SEU) approach that tries to explain the anomalies by simulating the
decision maker who makes a choice for maximizing the value of SEU. The
SEU in the prospect theory is defined by the probability weighting func-
tion and the value function. The probability weighting function represents
the psychological tendency to overestimate small probabilities and underes-
timate large ones. The value function represents the tendency that a loss
gives a greater feeling of pain compared to the joy given by an equivalent
gain. (The amount of loss or gain is measured from reference point whose
position fluctuates situationally.) However, the development of experimen-
tal economics brought the finds of anomalies that cannot be captured in
the prospect theory or its gentle modification. For examples, the anomalies
shown by [Ert & Erev(2013)],[Thaler & Johnson(1990)], [Payne(2015)] and
[Birnbaum(2008)] are well known and they are difficult to explain.
In recent years, trying to find a theory/model that can explain all anoma-
lies is a major topic in behavioral economics and, many researchers compete
for developing descriptive decision-making model1.
In this paper, we propose a new decision-making model that is not a gen-
tle modification of SEU. It is a model designed in the quantum-like approach,
where the state representation specific to the quantum mechanics is em-
ployed.2 Quantum mechanics is originally established for the description of
1Actually, Erev et al. [Ert & Erev(2013)] proposed and organized the fair competition
of model (From Anomalies to Forecasts: Choice Prediction Competition for Decisions
under Risk and Ambiguity (CPC2015)). The detail of this competition is reported in the
website http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/cpc2015.
2The problem of the state interpretation is one of the most complicated problems
of quantum foundations. The present situation is characterized by a huge diversity of
interpretations [(2009a)]. One of them is the information interpretation which was strongly
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statistical properties in microscopic phenomena. The fundamental assertion
in the quantum-like approach is that the formalism beyond the probability
theory is also applicable to anomalies in various phenomena not limited to
the microscopic cases.
We point out that there exist many quantum-like models designed under
this assertion ([de Barros & Suppes (2009)]; Accardi et al.[(2008), (2009)];
Asano et al.[(2011a), (2011b), (2011c), (2012a), (2012b)]; [Basieva et al.(2010)];
Busemeyer et al.[(2006a), (2006b), (2008), (2009), (2012)]; Cheon & Takahashi[(2006),
(2010)]; Conte et al.[(2006), (2008), (2009)]; [Dzhafarov & Kujala(2012)];
Haven & Khrennikov[(2009), (2013)]; Khrennikov et al.[(2003), (2004a), (2004b),
(2006), (2009a), (2009b), (2009c), (2011a), (2011b), (2014)]; [Ohya & Volovich(2011)];
[Pothos & Busemeyer(2009)]).3
Our main interest is not just to make a model that fits experimental
data of anomalies, but to offer the foundation for the new theory of expected
theory, that is, to describe human behavior using non-classical probabilities.
We believe that in order to develop the quantum-like approach further to
become an established theory, we need to investigate in a deep way how the
quantum-like approach compares to prospect theory. In this paper, we will
show that the characters of the probability weighting function and the value
function can be realized mathematically in a part of our quantum-like model.
Further, we will show that our model can explain several anomalies including
non-classical ones. These results suggest that our quantum-like model has
the potential to be a mile stone toward the development of model to cover
all known and yet unknown anomalies.
In Sec. 2, we mathematically define a cognitive process essential to make
a preference. Firstly, the decision maker in our model is aware of the exis-
tence of objects to be compared. The structure of awareness is represented
by density operator(matrix), which is the most general state representation
in quantum mechanics. We call it the comparison state. The decision maker
secondly compares the values (utilities) of objects quantitatively. This func-
supported by the recent quantum information revolution. We shall use this interpretation.
Thus a quantum-like mental state represents information available to decision makers and
structured in the special (quantum-like) way by their brains.
3The quantum-like approach works very well to model a variety of behavioral effects,
e.g., the order effect or disjunction and conjunction effects. However, it is not clear whether
the mathematical formalism of quantum theory can serve to model all possible behavioral
phenomena, see Khrennikov et al. [(2014)] and Boyer-Kassem et al. [(2016a)], [(2016b)]
for the recent analysis of this problem.
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tionality is represented as a mapping from the comparison state to a real
number, which is called the evaluation function. A selection decision is de-
rived from the above comparison state and evaluation function. In Sec. 2.3,
we discuss the modeling of selection between two lotteries. The main prob-
lem is how to embed the probability distributions into the comparison state.
Especially, the comparison state designed in Sec. 2.3.3 is important, because
it is closely related with the crucial concept in quantum theory: The state
transition, which occurs when a physical value is measured on a system, is
the basic assumption in quantum theory. A physical state before measure-
ment is generally represented with the form called quantum superposition
that is clearly distinguished from a statistical description as obtained after
measurement. If the comparison state at the stage before drawing the lots
is represented with quantum superposition, the character of the probability
weighting function can be explained, see Fig. 1 in Sec. 2.3.4.
It is also crucial that our model describes the cognitive process that is
never explained in the expected utility theory. For example, for the lottery
that pays $100 or $1 according to a probability distribution, a decision maker
might fear to get $1 by missing the chance of $100. Then, the difference of
these potential outcomes will affect his/her evaluation of risk. Such a process
is to be experienced before drawing the lottery but never after drawing,
and actually, its effect is represented in the comparison state with quantum
superposition, as the parameter called degree of evaluation of risk(DER).
We expect, the evaluation of risk is an essential cause of anomaly. In Sec.3,
this point will be shown clearly, where we simulate the famous anomalies in
selection behavior under ambiguity ; Ellsberg paradox ([Ellsberg(1961)]) and
the Machina paradox ([Machina(2009)])4. Ellsberg paradox, see Table. 1 is
the first example that shows the anomaly due to the ambiguity aversion,
which lets one to prefer the known risk to the unknown risk. The Machina
paradox, see Table. 3 points out an existence of anomaly that is impossible to
be explained even in the popular models of ambiguity aversion. Our analyses
are summarized in the diagrams of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 in Sec. 3.
In Sec. 4, we discuss the determination of cash equivalent (CE), which is
an amount of money whose value is indifferent from a given lot. The CE is
related to the willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP)
([Horowitz et al.(2003)]), each of which is interpreted as cash determined in
4There exists another quantum-like approach trying to solve the two paradoxes, see
([Aerts et al.(2012)]), in which the effect of DER is not assumed.
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the aim of selling or buying the lot. It is well-known that the relation of
WTA>WTP is generally observed in experimental tests, and this disparity
is an important topic in economics. As seen in Fig. 4, CE is defined as
the function of the degree of evaluation of risk (DER). Therefore, we can
explain the disparity from DER whose value is to be changed depending on
the decision maker’s situation. Note that in such a situation dependency is
consistent with the character of value function in the prospect theory.
2 A Model of Selection Behavior
There are two lots, say A and B. If you chose A, you will get outcome xi
(i = 1 · · ·n) with probability Pi. If you chose B, you will get outcome xi with
probability Qi. All of the outcomes are different from each other. Which lot
do you select?
When a decision maker decides the preference A ≻ B or B ≻ A in this
situation, he/she will recognize the following three points.
1. What objects exist,
2. Which pairs of objects are to be compared,
3. How comparisons are evaluated.
Here, we have to emphasize that “objects” mean “events” that will be expe-
rienced in the future. He/she can simulate the experience that he draws the
lot A (B) and get the outcome xi. Let us represent such an event by (A, xi)
or (B, xi). Further, we assume that the decision maker sets the utilities of
(A, xi) and (B, xi) by u(xi) ≡ ui. (The utility of event depends on only out-
come.) Here, u(x) is a utility function of outcome x. Under this assumption,
comparing an arbitrary pair of objects (events) becomes possible. Lastly,
the decision maker evaluates various comparisons for making the preference
A ≻ B or B ≻ A. If von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility theorem is
applied to this third point, the method consistent with VNM axioms (Com-
pleteness, Transitivity, Independence, Continuity) will be used. VNM axioms
are given for the relation of utilities like u ≻ v and the operation using prob-
ability like pu + (1 − p)v. Therefore, these encourage the decision maker
to estimate the expected utilities, EA =
∑n
i Piui and EB =
∑n
i Qiui, and
employ its difference as a sort of a criterion for making the preference.
However, the fact of anomalies shows that many people seem to violate
VNM axioms in their selection behaviors. For this problem, we have to men-
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tion the interpretation of probability used in the axioms. In the book “Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior”([Neumann & Morgenstern(1953)]), VNM
stressed the well founded interpretation of probability as frequency, but not
a subjective concept of probability, which is often visualized.
What is the subjective concept? It is not the frequency of event counted
through a large number of trial experiments, rather it is the weight of aware-
ness assigned for unmeasured event. The reason that many people often
visualize the latter impression might be simple: It is difficult for them to
simulate a large number of trial experiments in their minds, even if they
know the meaning of frequency probability. We believe, in a realistic selec-
tion behavior using the subjective probability, a “natural” operation exists,
which is different from the form of pu+ (1− p)v, and in this section, we de-
scribe it by using the framework of quantum theory. It is a significant point
that quantum theory mathematically defines a state before measurement.
Here, one can interpret the state as a subjective recognition for uncertain
(unmeasured) events, if the measurement is regarded as an acquisition of
subjective experience. Such an interpretation of quantum theory is called
“Qbism”, see the papers of [Fuchs & Schack(2013)]. (Note, QBism never
deny the standard interpretation in quantum physics, rather, includes it.) In
Sec.2.1 and Sec.2.2, the three points introduced in the above are explained
in the state representation based on QBism, and in Sec.2.3, a criterion for
selection is defined as a “natural” operation with potential to violate VNM
axioms.
2.1 Comparison State
Firstly, the decision maker is aware of existences of objects. Secondly, he/she
is aware of various pairs of objects to be compared. As mentioned in the be-
ginning of section, the “objects” we consider here are the “events” individ-
ual and incompatible each other. The decision maker preliminarily assigns
his/her awarenesses for these events. In our model, its distribution is math-
ematically represented in the form of a density operator, which is the general
state representation in quantum theory. In a sense, this representation plays
the role of prior probability distribution that is different from statistical prob-
ability distribution.
The density operator ρ we use here is defined as a N ×N complex matrix
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on a finite dimensional complex vector space H = CN , which is described as
ρ =
N∑
k,l
ρkl|k〉〈l| =
N∑
k,l
ρkltkl. (1)
The notation |k〉 (〈k|), which is called ket vector (bra vector), means a column
vector (row vector) with the k-th component is 1, and other components are
zero. Thus, {|k〉}(k = 1 · · ·N) is a set of vectors that are normalized and
orthogonal to each other; 〈k|l〉 = δkl. (〈k|l〉 means the inner product of two
vectors.) Hereafter, we call the set {|k〉} a complete orthonormal system
(CONS) in H. 〈k|ρ|l〉 = ρkl ∈ C is (k, l)-component of the matrix ρ. The
notation tkl denotes the operator |k〉〈l|, which acts as follows: tkl |h〉 = δlh |k〉.
In general, a density operator satisfies the following conditions:
1. ρkl = ρ
∗
lk ; the self-adjoint is satisfied.
2. tr(ρ) = 1 ; the diagonal sum is one.
3. ∀x ∈ H, 〈x| ρ |x〉 ≥ 0 ; the positivity is satisfied.
(ρ∗lk means the complex conjugate of ρlk.)
We divide this matrix into the diagonal part and non-diagonal part;
ρ = ρd + ρnd (2)
where
ρd =
N∑
k
ρkktkk =
N∑
k
ρkkEk
ρnd =
∑
k<l
ρkltkl + ρlktlk =
∑
k<l
|ρkl|(eiθkl tkl + e−iθkl tlk ) =
∑
k<l
|ρkl |Ck↔l
From the above three conditions, the components {ρkk} in ρd are real numbers
with ρkk > 0 and
∑N
k ρkk = 1. The components ρkl in ρnd are generally
complex numbers, ρkl = |ρkl|eiθkl . The operators tkk = Ek and eiθkl tkl +
e−iθkl tlk = Ck↔l in the above equations are also called transition operators:
Ek transits the vector |k〉 to itself:
Ek |h〉 = |k〉〈k|h〉 = δkh |k〉 .
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Ck↔l transits |k〉 to e−iθkl |l〉 or |l〉 to eiθkl |k〉:
Ck↔l |h〉 = δlheiθkl |k〉+ δkhe−iθkl |l〉 .
We interpret the structure of ρ as follows: The CONS {|k〉} corresponds to
N objects. The transition operator Ek represents awareness of existence of
object-k and Ck↔l represents awareness of a pair of objects k and l. The
values of ρkk and |ρkl| imply the “weights” of awareness assigned for these
cognitive processes. We call the density matrix ρ the comparison state, here-
after.
Simple Example of Comparison State
Let us introduce a most simple comparison state with N = 2. The decision
maker is aware of two objects and recognizes them as one pair to be compared.
Then, the following 2 × 2 matrix on H = C2 is considered as a form of
comparison state.
ρ =
(
α2 αβeiθ12
αβe−iθ12 β2
)
= (α2E1 + β
2E2) + αβC1↔2 (3)
α and β are real numbers satisfying α2 + β2 = 1. The weights α2, β2 and
αβ are assigned for the cognitive processes E1,2 and C1↔25. In principle, the
values of α and β are to be determined subjectively by the decision maker.
In the case of (α, β) = (0, 1) or (1, 0), αβ is zero. This implies that the
decision maker recognizes the pair of objects, if and only if he/she is aware
of the existence of both objects. Also, the condition of (α, β) = ( 1√
2
, 1√
2
)
implies that the decision maker pays attention to the existence of them, in a
fair way.
2.2 Evaluation Function
The decision maker we postulate has a function to compare an arbitrarily
pair which is chosen from N objects. It is the quantitative evaluation defined
5The form of Eq. (3) is rewritten as
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, |ψ〉 = αeiθ12 |1〉+ β |2〉 =
(
αeiθ12
β
)
.
Such representation, which is called pure state in quantum theory, is used in the general
construction of comparison state, see Sec. 2.3.
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by the following map.
ϕD : S(H) 7→ R, ϕD(·) := tr(D·). (4)
S(H) denotes the set of all of comparison states (density matrices) on H =
CN . The operator D is defined by a self-adjoint operator 6, which is also
written as a N ×N complex matrix;
D =
N∑
k,l
F (k, l)|k〉〈l| =
N∑
k,l
F (k, l)tkl (5)
F (k, l) ∈ C is (k, l)-component of the matrix. From the self-adjoint property,
F (k, l)∗ = F (l, k) is satisfied. The objects k and l are events independent and
incompatible each other. (The orthogonality 〈k|l〉 = δk,l implies this fact.)
However, the decision maker correlates them in his/her cognitive operation
of comparison. The correlation, that is, how the decision maker sees the
difference between k and l is encoded in the term of F (k, l) = 〈k|D|l〉. We
give its form as
F (k, l) = (uk − ul)eiφkl , (6)
where uk is the utility that the decision maker feels for the object-k. Here-
after, we call ϕD the evaluation function.
Simple Example of Evaluation
Let us explain the use of evaluation function ϕD(ρ) in the selection between
two objects: The comparison state ρ is given in the form of Eq. (3):
ρ =
1
2
(
1 eiθ12
e−iθ12 1
)
.
where the fairness (α, β) = ( 1√
2
, 1√
2
) is assumed. From the definition of
Eq. (6), the operator D is given as 2× 2 matrix as
D =
(
0 (u1 − u2)eiφ12
(u1 − u2)e−iφ12 0
)
.
6In the formalism of quantum theory, a measurable physical quantity is given by a
self-adjoint operator like D, and the value of tr(Dρ) is defined as the expectation value of
D for the state ρ.
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From the calculation
Dρ =
u1 − u2
2
(
ei(φ12−θ12) eiφ12
e−iφ12 e−i(φ12−θ12)
)
,
the evaluation
ϕD(ρ) = tr(Dρ) = cosΘ12(u1 − u2), Θ12 = φ12 − θ12
is obtained. The parameter Θ12 determines the direction for evaluation. For
example, in the case of cosΘ12 > 0, the above ϕD(ρ) is used in the following
way.
If ϕD(ρ) ≥ 0, then 1  2, If ϕD(ρ) ≤ 0, then 2  1.
In the case of cosΘ12 < 0,
If ϕD(ρ) ≤ 0, then 1  2, If ϕD(ρ) ≥ 0, then 2  1.
2.3 Criterion for Selection
Let us remind the situation in the beginning of section: If a decision maker
draws the lot A (B), he/she will get the outcome xi (i = 1, · · · , n) with the
probability Pi (Qi). We defined the objects in this situation as the events
(experiences),
{ (A, x1), · · · , (A, xn), (B, x1), · · · , (B, xn) } .
(For example, (A, xk) denotes the event (experience) that he/she draws the
lot A and gets the outcome xk.) In our modeling, these are to be represented
by vectors in Hilbert space. Firstly, let us introduce the tensor product of
spaces, H = HLot ⊗ HOutcome; HLot is the two dimensional space spanned
by the two vectors |A〉 and |B〉, and HOutcome is the n dimensional space
spanned by {|xi〉 , i = 1, · · · , n}. Here, 〈A|B〉 = 〈B|A〉 = 0, 〈xi|xj〉 = δi,j are
assumed, that is,
{|A〉 ⊗ |x1〉 , · · · , |A〉 ⊗ |xn〉 , |B〉 ⊗ |x1〉 , · · · , |B〉 ⊗ |xn〉}.
is a CONS of H = C2n. These vectors correspond to the above objects.
Hereafter, {|A〉 ⊗ |xi〉} and {|B〉 ⊗ |xi〉} are replaced by {|i〉 , i = 1, · · · , n}
and {|¯i〉 = |n + i〉 , i = 1, · · · , n}: We call the events (experiences) (A, xi)
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and (B, xi), object-i and object-¯i. (The utility of object-i or object-¯i is given
by u(xi) = ui.)
The comparison state ρ can be defined in H = CN with N = 2n. Then,
the statistical information of {Pi } and {Qi } will be embedded in its struc-
ture. In this subsection, the two types of ρ are designed under different
interpretations, and in each case, the evaluation ϕD(ρ) is used as the crite-
rion for selection between A and B.
2.3.1 Classical Comparison State
After you draw the two lots, you will recognize the experiences (A, xi) and
(B, xj) with the probability Pi ×Qj.
This context is explained in the following comparison state.
ρC =
n∑
i,j=1
PiQj |ψij〉〈ψij| ∈ S(H), (7)
where |ψij〉 is the normalized vector with the form of
|ψij〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉 ⊗ |xi〉+ |B〉 ⊗ |xj〉) = 1√
2
(|i〉+ |j¯〉),
where j¯ = n + j. The state ρC has the form of so-called mixed state
7. Note
that |ψij〉〈ψij| in ρC is rewritten as
|ψij〉〈ψij| = 1
2
(Ei + Ej¯) +
1
2
Ci↔j¯,
which is the same with the state of Eq. (3) with (α, β) = ( 1√
2
, 1√
2
): The
decision maker at |ψij〉〈ψij | is aware of the existence of objects denoted by i,
j¯ and recognizes them as one pair. This is interpreted as the cognitive state
that is experienced after drawing the two lots.
2.3.2 Classical Criterion
The evaluation of the comparison state ρC is calculated as
ϕD(ρC) =
n∑
i,j=1
PiQjϕD(|ψij〉〈ψij |) =
n∑
i,j=1
PiQj cosΘij¯(ui − uj). (8)
7Generally, a mixed state is defined as ρ =
∑M
k
αk|ψk〉〈ψk|, where {αk } is a probability
distribution satisfying
∑
M
k
αk = 1, and { | ψk〉 ∈ CN } are N -dimensional vectors whose
norms are one.
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Here, we used the operatorD of Eq. (6). The value of ϕD(ρC) is the statistical
expectation of {ϕD( | ψij〉〈ψij |) }. Especially, if all of {Θij¯ } have the same
value Θ, it is proportional to the difference of expected utilities;
ϕD(ρC) = cosΘ(
n∑
i=1
Piui −
n∑
j=1
Qjuj) ∝ EA − EB. (9)
As result, our model can realize the criterion based on the expected utility
theory as one example.
2.3.3 Non-classical Comparison State
The classical comparison state ρC of Eq. (7) has the form as the statistical
description of the cognitive states {|ψij〉〈ψij |}, which are experienced after
drawing the lots. In this subsection, we discuss another comparison state
that describes cognitive processes before drawing. We start this discussion by
regarding the action of drawing of lot as a sort ofmeasurement. Acquisition of
information through a measurement resolves uncertainty, which an observer
holds before measurement. In other word, by the measurement, awareness
of uncertainty is transited to the one of definite information. We believe
that such transition is described in the mathematical formalism of quantum
theory, which have discussed state changes by measurement, generally. In
our description, awareness of uncertainties on the two lots is represented by
the following two density operators.
σA = |ψA〉〈ψA|, σB = |ψB〉〈ψB|, (10)
where |ψA〉 and |ψB〉 are defined as normalized vectors in H = CN=2n. If
the decision maker draws the lot A and knows the result of event (A, xi)
(object-i), for example, the uncertainty symbolized by σA is transited to the
definite cognition |i〉〈i|. According to quantum theory, the state transition
from σA to |i〉〈i| is represented by
MiσAM
∗
i
tr(MiσAM∗i )
= |i〉〈i|,
where Mi(i = 1, · · · , N) is called measurement operator and defined by Mi =
|i〉〈i|. Further, the statistical description obtained after measurements {Mi }
is defined by
n∑
i=1
MiσAM
∗
i =
n∑
i=1
tr(MiσAM
∗
i )|i〉〈i| =
n∑
i=1
| 〈i|ψA〉 |2|i〉〈i|.
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Here, the value of tr(MiσAM
∗
i ) corresponds to the probability of measure-
ment of result i:
tr(MiσAM
∗
i ) = | 〈i|ψA〉 |2 = Pi.
Thus, the vector |ψA〉 in σA is written as
|ψA〉 =
n∑
i=1
√
Pie
iθAi |i〉. (11)
This form is called quantum superposition. Similarly, |ψB〉 in σB has the form
of
|ψB〉 =
n∑
i=1
√
Qie
iθB
i¯ |¯i〉. (12)
As seen in these results, the probability distributions {Pi } and {Qj } are
embedded as elements determining the directions of |ψA,B〉.
With using the above |ψA,B〉, we define the following comparison state:
ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψA〉+ |ψB〉). (13)
Note, this ρ is rewritten as
ρ =
1
2
(σA + σB) +
1
2
CA↔B. (14)
where
CA↔B = |ψA〉〈ψB|+ |ψB〉〈ψA|.
The form of Eq (14) clearly explains the basic cognitive processes for the
selection between A and B at the stage before measurement: the term of
1
2
(σA+σB) in Eq. (14) implies that the decision maker is aware of the existence
of two lots. The term of CA↔B implies that he/she recognizes the two lots
as one pair to be compared.
2.3.4 Non-classical Criterion
Let us discuss the evaluation of the non-classical comparison state ρ;
ϕD(ρ) = ϕD
(
1
2
σA
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
σB
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
CA↔B
)
. (15)
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Here, we use the evaluation function ϕD with D of Eq. (6). The first and
second terms ϕD
(
1
2
σA
)
and ϕD
(
1
2
σB
)
are calculated as
ϕD
(
1
2
σA
)
=
n∑
i,j=1
√
PiPj cosΘij(ui − uj)
ϕD
(
1
2
σB
)
=
n∑
i,j=1
√
QiQj cosΘi¯j¯(ui − uj), (16)
where Θij = φij − θAi + θAj and Θi¯j¯ = φi¯j¯ − θBi¯ + θBj¯ . We call these terms the
evaluations of risks. For example, if the outcome in the lot A is $100 with
probability P and $10 with probability 1−P , a decision maker might feel the
risk by seeing the difference between $100 and $10, and he/she will estimate
the highest risk when P = 1/2. In this way, a decision maker will evaluate
the risk from the differences of outcomes and probabilities. As seen in the
form of Eq. (16), the degrees of evaluations of risks are specified by the values
of { cosΘij } and { cosΘi¯j¯ }. Hereafter, we call them DERs. The evaluation
of risk seems to be experienced in realistic selection behavior. However, in
the classical criterion ϕD(ρC), this empirical fact is ignored, see Sec. 2.3.2.
The third term ϕD
(
1
2
CA↔B
)
in Eq. (15) is calculated as
ϕD
(
1
2
CA↔B
)
=
n∑
i,j=1
√
PiQj cosΘij¯(ui − uj), (17)
where Θij¯ = φij¯ − θAi + θBj¯ . This term corresponds to the classical criterion
ϕD(ρC) =
∑
i,j PiQj cosΘij¯(ui − uj) of Eq. (8). It should be noted here that
the weights of awareness in Eq. (17) are given by square roots of products
of probabilities. In the case of Θij¯ = Θ, the classical criterion realizes the
selection based on the expected utility theory, see Eq. (9). In the same case,
Eq. (17) is written as
ϕD
(
1
2
CA↔B
)
= cosΘ
[
n∑
i,j=1
√
PiQjui −
n∑
i,j=1
√
PiQjuj
]
.
Here, we consider the following value:
ϕD
(
1
2
CA↔B
)
∑
k,l
√
PkQl
= cosΘ
[
n∑
i=1
√
Pi∑
k
√
Pk
ui −
n∑
j=1
√
Qj∑
lQl
uj
]
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= cosΘ
[
n∑
i=1
P˜iui −
n∑
j=1
Q˜juj
]
. (18)
Note,
∑n
i=1 P˜i = 1 and
∑n
j=1 Q˜j = 1. From the above equation, one can see
that the evaluation ϕD
(
1
2
CA↔B
)
is essentially equivalent to the calculation
of expected utilities,
∑
i P˜iui and
∑
j Q˜juj. We call { P˜i } and { Q˜i }, which
are different from the statistical probabilities, subjective probabilities. The
subjective probability P˜i is rewritten as
P˜i =
√
Pi√
Pi +
(∑
k 6=i
√
Pk
1−Pi
)√
1− Pi
=
√
Pi√
Pi + ξ
√
1− Pi
. (19)
The values of { Pk 6=i
1−Pi } in the above equation mean the probability distribution
of results except for i. The range of ξ =
∑
k 6=i
√
Pk
1−Pi is 1 ≤ ξ ≤
√
m− 1.
Let us explain the relation between statistical and subjective probabilities
by using the function,
wξ(x) =
√
x√
x+ ξ
√
1− x (0 ≤ x ≤ 1). (20)
Figure.1 shows the behavior of wξ(x) at m = 3 and ξ =
√
m− 1. One
can find that wξ(x) realizes the character of probability weighting function,
which explains the experimental fact that small (statistical) probabilities are
overestimated, and large probabilities are underestimated, subjectively. In
the prospect theory, the probability weighting function is the important con-
cept to explain the violation of independence axiom in VNM theory. Actu-
ally, from phenomenological discussions, various weighting functions has been
proposed([Prelec(1998), Rieger& Wang(2006), Tversky & Kahneman(1992)]).
Especially, we note the form of two-parameter weighting function,
wλ,δ(x) =
δxλ
δxλ + (1− x)λ ,
which was discussed in [Gonzalez & Wu (1999)]. The parameters λ and
δ control the curvature and elevation of function, respectively. This phe-
nomenological function with λ = 1/2 and δ = 1/ξ is realized in the form of
Eq. (20), which is derived from the state representation by density operator.
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Figure 1: The behavior of wξ(x) atm = 3 and ξ =
√
m− 1 (solid line) that is
similar to the probability weighting function proposed in the prosect theory.
In the discussions so far, we showed that the non-classical criterion ϕD(ρ)
had the two characteristics:
1. ϕD(ρ) includes the evaluation of risk.
2. ϕD(ρ) explains the property of probability weighting function.
These are important points needed for the description of realistic selection
behaviors. Actually, in the below sections, ϕD(ρ) is used to describe several
famous decision-making phenomena, which are impossible to be explained in
the framework of the standard expected utility theory.
3 Description of Selection Behavior Under Am-
biguity
In this section, we consider selection behavior under unknown risk whose
probability distribution is not informed. Selection behavior under ambigu-
ity was first discussed by Ellsberg: He pointed out that many real decision
makers prefer known risks to unknown risks, and such a tendency called
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Table 1: Example of Ellsberg Paradox.
30balls 60balls
R W Y
f1 $100 0 0
f2 0 $100 0
f3 $100 0 $100
f4 0 $100 $100
ambiguity aversion cannot be explained in the standard expected utility the-
ory. To solve this paradox, several mathematical models have been proposed.
However, Machina recently presented the example of selection behavior under
ambiguity that cannot be explained even in the popular models of ambigu-
ity aversion. In Sec.3.1, we discuss the solution of Ellsberg paradox in our
model, and in Sec.3.2, we show that our model also can solve the Machina
paradox in the same manner.
3.1 Solution of Ellsberg Paradox
The Ellsberg Paradox is explained in the following sentence:
An urn contains 90 balls. 30 balls are red (R). The other 60 balls are either
white (W ) or yellow (Y ), but its ratio is unknown. Consider the four lotteries
shown in Table.1, in each of which, if you draw one ball from the urn, you
might get $100.
Note, all of the lotteries consist of the event of getting $100 and the one of
getting nothing. The table.2 shows the probabilities that are assigned for the
events,{(fk , 100), (fk, 0), k = 1, 2, 3, 4}. The parameter α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) in the
table specifies the unknown ratio of white and yellow balls, and it is included
in the probabilities of (fk, 100) and (fk, 0) with k = 2, 3. One can see that
the lots f2 and f3 have ambiguities on the probabilities of results. Ellsberg
predicted that many real decision makers prefer f1 to f2 and f4 to f3, that
is, (f1 ≻ f2)∧ (f4 ≻ f3). This tendency of ambiguity aversion is inconsistent
with the standard manner according to the expected utility theory, in which,
f1 ≻ f2 if and only if f3 ≻ f4. The aim in this subsection is to simulate
the selection behavior in the above situation by using the model in Sec. 2.
Firstly, let us consider the comparison state given for the selection between
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Table 2: Probabilities of events (fk, 100) and (fk, 0).
(fk, 100) (fk, 0)
f1 1/3 2/3
f2 2α/3 (3− 2α)/3
f3 (3− 2α)/3 2α/3
f4 2/3 1/3
f1 and f2. We use the form of non-classical state of Eq. (13);
ρf1−f2 = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, |Ψ〉 =
1√
2
(|ψf1〉+ |ψf2〉), (21)
where
|ψf1〉 =
√
1
3
|f1〉 ⊗ |100〉+
√
2
3
|f1〉 ⊗ |0〉 =
√
1
3
|1〉+
√
2
3
|2〉 ,
|ψf2〉 =
√
2α
3
|f2〉 ⊗ |100〉+
√
1− 2α
3
|f2〉 ⊗ |0〉 =
√
2α
3
|3〉+
√
1− 2α
3
|4〉 .
(22)
Here, {|1〉 , |2〉 , |3〉 , |4〉} is a CONS on H = C4, which corresponds to the set
of events in the lots f1 and f2. Note, ρf1−f2 is rewritten as
ρf1−f2 =
1
2
σf1 +
1
2
σf2 +
1
2
Cf1↔f2,
with σfk = |ψfk〉〈ψfk | and Cf1↔f2 = |ψf1〉〈ψf2 |+ |ψf2〉〈ψf1|.
The operator D in the evaluation function ϕD is defined in the form of
Eq. (6);
D =
4∑
i,j
F (i, j)|i〉〈j|, (23)
where F (i, j)∗ = F (j, i). If (i, j) = ((fk, 100), (fk′, 0)), F (i, j) = (u($100)−
u(0))eiφij and if (i, j) = ((fk, 100), (fk′, 100)) or ((fk, 0), (fk′, 0)), F (i, j) = 0.
In the above definitions, the criterion ϕD(ρf1−f2) is calculated as
ϕD(ρf1−f2) = ϕD
(
1
2
σf1
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
σf2
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
Cf1↔f2
)
,
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ϕD
(
1
2
σf1
)
=
√
2
3
cosΘ12δu, (24)
ϕD
(
1
2
σf2
)
=
√
2α(3− 2α)
3
cosΘ34δu, (25)
ϕD
(
1
2
Cf1↔f2
)
=
(√
3− 2α
3
cosΘ14 +
2
√
α
3
cosΘ23
)
δu. (26)
Here δu = u($100) − u(0) > 0. ϕD
(
1
2
Cf1↔f2
)
consists of
√
3−2α
3
cosΘ14δu
and 2
√
α
3
cosΘ23δu, which are the terms of comparison between (f1, 100) and
(f2, 0), and the one between (f1, 0) and (f2, 100), respectively. The difference
of utilities of (f1, 100) and (f2, 0) will contribute to increase the preference
of f1, and the difference of utilities of (f1, 0) and (f2, 100) will decrease it.
From this perspective, cosΘ14 ≥ 0 and cosΘ23 ≤ 0 are assumed. The terms
of ϕD
(
1
2
σf1
)
and ϕD
(
1
2
σf2
)
represent the evaluations of risks in f1 and f2.
For the decision maker who has the tendency to dislike (like) risks, the risk in
f1 will become a cause to decrease (increase) the preference of f1, and the one
in f2 will be a cause to increase (decrease) it. Thus, the two degrees of evalua-
tions of risks (DERs) given by cosΘ12 and cosΘ34 satisfy cosΘ12 cosΘ34 ≤ 0.
Further, we have to note that ϕD
(
1
2
σf2
)
has the unknown parameter α, see
Eq. (25), that is, it is the evaluation of risk with ambiguity. According to
Ellsberg’s prediction, generally, the unknown risk affects the selection be-
havior more strongly than the known risk. This essence is represented in the
condition | cosΘ12| < | cosΘ34| in our model. To simplify the discussion, let
us set the parameters {Θij } as satisfying
cosΘ14 = 1, cosΘ23 = −1, cosΘ12 = 0, cosΘ34 = λ.
Then,
ϕD(ρf1−f2) =
(√
3− 2α
3
− 2
√
α
3
+ λ
√
2α(3− 2α)
3
)
δu. (27)
The parameter λ is DER for the lot f2 with ambiguity; if λ > 0 (< 0), the
decision maker dislikes (likes) the ambiguity. This criterion is used as f1 ≻ f2
if ϕD(ρf1−f2) > 0 or f2 ≻ f1 if ϕD(ρf1−f2) < 0. In the same manner, we can
consider the criterion for the selection between f3 and f4 that is given by
ϕD(ρf4−f3) =
(
2
√
α
3
−
√
3− 2α
3
+ λ
√
2α(3− 2α)
3
)
δu. (28)
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Figure 2: α − λ phase diagram of selection in Ellseberg Paradox, in which,
the parameter α specifies the unknown ratio and λ is DER for the lots f2
and f3. Ellsberg’s prediction ((f1 ≻ f2) ∧ (f4 ≻ f3)) is realized in the range
of λ > 0.
Note, the comparison state ρf4−f3 is defined on the Hilbert space H′ = C4,
which is different from H. This criterion is used as f4 ≻ f3 if ϕD(ρf4−f3) > 0
or f3 ≻ f4 if ϕD(ρf4−f3) < 0. The parameter λ in the third term is DER for
the lot f3 with ambiguity.
The criterions shown in Eqs. (27) and (28) are regarded as the functions of
variables α and λ: ϕD(ρf1−f2) := Sf1−f2(α, λ) and ϕD(ρf4−f3) := Sf4−f3(α, λ).
Thus, the decision maker’s selection depends on the values of (α, λ). See
Fig. 2 that shows α − λ phase diagram giving (f1 ≻ f2) ∧ (f3 ≻ f4), (f1 ≻
f2) ∧ (f4 ≻ f3), (f2 ≻ f1) ∧ (f4 ≻ f3) or (f2 ≻ f1) ∧ (f3 ≻ f4).
Let us see the line of λ = 0 in this diagram: The preference (f1 ≻
f2) ∧ (f3 ≻ f4) is obtained when α < 1/2, and (f2 ≻ f1) ∧ (f4 ≻ f3)
when α < 1/2. This is consistent with the result derived from the standard
expected utility theory. One can see that the preference (f1 ≻ f2)∧(f4 ≻ f3),
which was predicted by Ellsberg, appears in the range of λ > 0. Then, the
decision maker has the tendency to dislike the unknown risks in f2 and f3
and embeds this evaluation into his (her) selection behavior. Especially, at
α ≈ 1/2, the preference (f1 ≻ f2) ∧ (f4 ≻ f3) is realized even if the positive
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Table 3: Example of the Machina Paradox.
50balls 51balls
R B W Y
f1 202 202 101 101
f2 202 101 202 101
f3 303 202 101 0
f4 303 101 202 0
λ is very small. In general, α and λ are quantities that are fluctuated or
determined subjectively by the decision maker. However, we predict that
many people stay at α ≈ 1/2 unless some external information on the ratio
of white and yellow balls is given. In other words, we are forced to be aware
of the existence of white and yellow balls fairly, in the presence of the fact
that the ratio is unknown. From such a perspective, we conclude that Fig. 2
encourages Ellsberg’s prediction.
3.2 Solution of the Machina Paradox
Machina presented the following situation as an example of selection under
ambiguity []:
An urn contains 101 balls. The 50 balls are either red (R) or black(B).
The 51 balls are either white (W) or yellow (Y). These ratios are unknown.
Consider the four lotteries shown in Table. 3, where you will get outcomes
whose utilities are 303, 202 , 101 or 0, if you draw one ball from the urn.
The lots f1 and f2 consist of (fk, 2a) and (fk, a) with a = 101. The lots f3
and f4 consist of (fk, 3a), (fk, 2a), (fk, a) and (fk, 0). The table. 4 shows the
probabilities assigned for these events, where p = 50/101, q = 1−p = 51/101
and the parameters α, β (0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1) specify the unknown ratio of R and
B and the one ofW and Y . One can see that only the lot f1 is unambiguous,
and other lots have ambiguity on the probabilities of events. Machina pointed
out that this example falsifies the popular models of ambiguity aversion
including Choquet expected utility([Schmeidler(1989)]), maxmin expected
utility([Gilboa & Schmeidler(1989)]), variational preferences([Maccheroni et al.(2006)]),
α-maxmin([Ghirardato et al.(2004)]) and the smooth model of ambiguity
aversion([Klibanoff et al.(2005)]). According to these models, f3 ≻ f4 if and
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Table 4: Probabilities of events (fk, 3a), (fk, 2a), (fk, a), (fk, 0)
(fk, 2a) (fk, a)
f1 p q
f2 pα + qβ 1− (pα + qβ)
(fk, 3a) (fk, 2a) (fk, a) (fk, 0)
f3 pα p(1− α) qβ q(1− β)
f4 pα qβ p(1− α) q(1− β)
only if f1 ≻ f2. Since f1 is unambiguous, the preference f1 ≻ f2 can be in-
terpreted as the result of the ambiguity aversion. However, both of f3 and f4
include ambiguities. Note, the lotteries f2 and f4 have a slight advantage due
to the 51th ball that may yield 202. In the choice between f1 and f2, there is
a tradeoff between the advantage offered by f2 and the unambiguity offered
by f1. On the other hand, such trade-off seems to be less in the selection of
f3 or f4. From this perspective, (f1 ≻ f2) ∧ (f4 ≻ f3) can not be denied as a
realistic selection.
With using the manner discussed in Sec.2.1, we analyze the selection
behavior in this situation. Criterion for the selection between f1 and f2 is
designed as
ϕD(ρf1−f2) = ϕD
(
1
2
σf1
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
σf2
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
Cf1↔f2
)
, (29)
where
ϕD
(
1
2
σf1
)
= 0, (30)
ϕD
(
1
2
σf2
)
=
√
(pα+ qβ)(1− (pα + qβ))λa, (31)
ϕD
(
1
2
Cf1↔f2
)
=
(√
p(1− (pα + qβ))−
√
q(pα + qβ)
)
a. (32)
We assume, the DER for the lot f1 with the known risk is zero, see Eq. (30),
and the DER for the lot f2 with the unknown risk is λ, see Eq. (31). All of
the comparisons of utilities are embedded in the term of Eq. (32). We define
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this criterion as a function of α, β and λ; ϕD(ρf1−f2) := Sf1−f2(α, β, λ).
If Sf1−f2(α, β, λ) > 0 (Sf1−f2(α, β, λ) < 0), f1 ≻ f2 (f2 ≻ f1). Next, the
criterion for the selection between f3 and f4 is designed as
ϕD(ρf4−f3) = ϕD
(
1
2
σf4
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
σf3
)
+ ϕD
(
1
2
Cf4↔f3
)
, (33)
where
ϕD
(
1
2
σf4
)
= −2
(
p
√
α(1− α) + q
√
β(1− β)
)
λa, (34)
ϕD
(
1
2
σf3
)
=
(
p
√
α(1− α) + q
√
β(1− β)
)
λa, (35)
ϕD
(
1
2
Cf4↔f3
)
=
(√
pqαβ + q
√
β(1− β) + qβ
)
a
−
(√
pq(1− α)(1− β) + p
√
α(1− α) + p(1− α)
)
a. (36)
Note, the DERs for f3 and f4 with the unknown risks are also specified by
the parameter λ, see Eqs. (34) and (35). If ϕD(ρf4−f3) := Sf4−f3(α, β, λ) > 0
(Sf4−f3(α, β, λ) < 0), f4 ≻ f3 (f3 ≻ f4). Figure. 3 shows α − λ phase
diagram in the case of α = β. Let us see the line of λ = 0 in this figure. If
α > 50/101, the selection (f2 ≻ f1) ∧ (f4 ≻ f3) is realized. As mentioned
in the previous section, the decision maker will stay at α = β ≈ 1/2, unless
some information on the unknown ratios is given. Since 1/2 > 50/101, the
one selects f2 and f4; in a sense, the difference between 1/2 and 50/101
represents the slight advantage of f2 and f4, which comes from the belief
that the 51th ball might be W . When λ becomes large, (f1 ≻ f2)∧ (f4 ≻ f3)
and (f1 ≻ f2) ∧ (f3 ≻ f4) are appearing. As mentioned previously, the
positive λ implies the tendency of ambiguity aversion which decreases the
values of f2, f3 and f4 with ambiguity. As seen in the diagram of Fig. 3,
the value of λ needed to invert f2 ≻ f1 to f1 ≻ f2 is not so large, but λ to
invert f4 ≻ f3 to f3 ≻ f4 has the higher value. The suppression of inversion
from f4 ≻ f3 to f3 ≻ f4 is due to the competition between the evaluations of
unknown risks offered by the both lots, see Eqs. (34) and (35). As a result,
our model explains the existence of selection (f1 ≻ f2)∧ (f4 ≻ f3), which has
not been explained in the popular models of ambiguity aversion.
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Figure 3: α− λ Phase Diagram of Selection in the Machina Paradox
4 Decision of Cash Equivalent
In this section, we consider cash equivalent(CE) for lot with risk that means
amount of money whose utility is indifferent with the utility of receiving lot:
uCE = uLOT .
This relation can be interpreted as a result of comparison between the two
alternatives, the selection of definite cash and the one of lot. Thus, the
decision of CE can be discussed in the framework of our comparison model.
For example, let us consider a comparison between a cash x and a lot whose
outcome is y(> 0) with probability p or nothing with q = 1 − p. Then, the
comparison state is given as
ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
|ψlot〉+ 1√
2
|ψcash〉 , (37)
where
|ψlot〉 = √p |L〉 ⊗ |y〉+√q |L〉 ⊗ |0〉 = √p |1〉+√q |2〉 ,
|ψcash〉 = |C〉 ⊗ |x〉 = |3〉 . (38)
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Figure 4: Behavior of cash equivalent of lot.
The comparison state ρ is defined in H = C3. With the same manner in the
previous sections, we design the following criterion.
ϕD(ρ) =
√
p(uy − ux)−√qux − λ√pquy. (39)
ux and uy are the utilities of the outcomes x and y, and u0 = 0 is assumed.
The parameter λ is the DER for the lot. If ϕD(ρ) = 0, the lot and x are
indifferent for the decision maker. We define the cash x in this case as the
CE of the lot;
uCE = ux =
√
p(1− λ√q)uy√
p+
√
q
. (40)
Figure. 4 shows the behavior of uCE/uy for the parameters of p and λ
(0 < p, λ < 1). One can see that for any p, uCE is smaller than uy, which
is the utility of the highest outcome in lot, and its value is decreased as λ
becomes large. Note, the decision maker at positive λ dislikes the risk of lot.
The CE defined in Eq. (40) will be closely related to willingness to accept
(WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) for the lot, because, each of them is
also defined as cash equivalent to the lot. WTA and WTP are conceptually
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distinguished in the difference situations that require the determination of
CE. WTA is the minimum cash which the decision maker accepts to sell the
lot. WTP is the maximum cash which the decision maker pays for getting
the lot. In the determination of WTA, the decision maker is endowed with
the lot. On the other hand, in the case of WTP, the decision maker does not
get the lot yet. In our model, this apparent difference of position is reflected
on the value of λ in Eq. (40). The seller abandons the right of drawing the
lot, therefore, he/she might not fear the underlying risk in the lot. The buyer
will be aware of the risk more strongly, because he/she might draw the lot.
From such a perspective, it is expected that seller’s λ will be smaller than
the one the buyer has. As seen in Fig. 4, if λ < λ′,
CE(λ) > CE(λ′)
is always satisfied. Actually, WTA > WTP is the fact that has been con-
firmed in various experimental tests. Also, this discussion is closely related
to preference reversal phenomena ([Tversky & Thaler(1990)]). It is the fol-
lowing decision making: There are two lots, one of which, say A, has a high
chance of winning a small prize, and another, say B, has a lower chance of
winning a larger. According to experimental tests, many people prefer A to
B (A ≻ B) but, they estimate WTA of B larger than the one of A. This fact
seems to show the violation of transitivity axiom: In the situation of selling
the lots, there exist a cash X satisfying the preference as B ≻ X ≻ A, in
spite of A ≻ B in the simple comparison of the two lots. The essence of pref-
erence reversal is almost same with the disparity between WTA and WTP:
In the situation of selling, they will estimate WTA with using λ, which is
smaller than λ′ expected to be used in the simple comparison between A and
B.
Here, we mention the popular interpretations on the disparity between
WTA and WTP: In the standard economic theory, the income effect has
been thought to be a cause of the disparity.8 WTP is generally constrained
by the present income, but WTA is not. However, the existence of disparity
is found in many experimental tests, in which, income effects are expected to
be small([Carmon & Ariely(2000), Kahneman et al.(1990)]). On the other
hand, in the prospect theory, the disparity is explained from the difference of
reference point in the value function. The value function evaluates gain or loss
8We remark the real situation is even more complicated: in standard economics there
are typically considered two effects - the income effect and substitution effect.
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of outcome from reference point that represents a decision maker’s situation.
The decision maker endowed with the lot and the one not endowed are posited
at different reference points. From these points, the compensation of loss of
lot (WTA) and the cost of gain of lot (WTP) are estimated respectively.
Generally, in the value function, the degree of depression of utility by loss
becomes larger than the one of enhancement of utility by gain. Therefore,
WTA>WTP is realized.
In our model, the existence of the parameter λ (DER) explains the dispar-
ity between WTA and WTP, and it is a psychological factor, which fluctuates
depending on the decision maker’s situation. This point is consisting with
the concept of value function in the prospect theory, where the reference
point fluctuates. Furthermore, the evaluation of loss or gain in the terms of
prospect theory is clearly represented as the function of λ.
5 Conclusion
The decision maker simulated in our model performs various comparisons
of objects to make a criterion of selection. As discussed in Sec. 2, all of
the comparisons are embedded into the comparison state ρ, and the crite-
rion is defined by the function ϕ(ρ). This quantum-like model has potential
to explain realistic selection behaviors. Actually, it clearly explains the be-
havior of probability weighting function, see Fig. 1. In the prospect theory,
the probability weighting function is assumed in a phenomenological sense
and used to explain the violation of independence axiom in VNM theory.
Further, our model describes comparisons, which are realistic operations but
have been ignored in the expected utility theory. The evaluation of such
comparison is reflected in the criterion ϕ(ρ), as the degree of evaluation of
risk (DER). As discussed in Sec. 3, DER plays the important role to solve
Ellsberg paradox and Machina paradox, see the diagrams of Figs. 2 and 3
where the parameters α and λ specify the unknown ratio and DER respec-
tively. Here, we predicted that many people would pay fair attentions to the
unknown probabilities and dislike the risk, that is, α ≈ 1/2 and λ > 0. The
decision maker at this position has the tendency of ambiguity aversion and
can realize the choice that Machina pointed out. Our solution is crucial, be-
cause the Machina paradox is difficult to be solved in the popular models of
ambiguity aversion. (Our solution might be closely related to the discussion
in the paper of [Baillon et al.(2011)], in which, models of decision making are
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discussed to account for the Machina paradox.) In Sec. 4, the disparity be-
tween WTA(willingness to accept) and WTP(willingness to pay) is explained.
Here, we assumed that DER is the sensitive quantity varying depending on
the situation of “accept” or “pay”, see Fig. 4. This property is closely re-
lated to the preference reversal phenomenon that shows anomaly violating
the transitivity axiom in VNM theory. More generally, DER might specify
personalities including habits, experiences and cognitive abilities. This point
will be very important from the view of experimental psychology.
Lastly, let us point out that this general modeling is applicable to various
decision making phenomena. For example, it can address more complicated
case such that a large number of alternatives exist. Naturally, a real decision
maker cannot pay attention to all alternatives, and such a situation will be
reflected on the form of comparison state. The problem on limited atten-
tion has been often discussed in the economic literatures, see the papers of
[Manzini & Mariotti(2014)] and [Masatlioglu et al. (2012)].
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